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AN APPEAL BY ANY OTHER NAME: CONGRESS'S EMPTY VIC-
TORY OVER HABEAS RIGHTS-Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333
(1996)
I. Introduction: Jurisdiction Stripping, Past and Present
At two different moments in American history, Congress acted to
limit the capacity of society's most hated criminals to waste time and
public resources arguing for their rights in the federal courts. In 1867, the
hated criminals were traitorous Confederates who had shed the blood of
Union soldiers and the Congress consisted of a veto-proof majority of
Radical Republicans representing the victorious Union side.' By stripping
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear appeals of circuit court habeas
denials, Congress circumscribed the Confederates' rights to challenge
their convictions via the writ of habeas corpus.
2
In April, Congress passed Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 3 ("the Act"), which limited most convicts
to one federal habeas petition4 and eliminated the Supreme Court's juris-
diction to review federal circuit court denials of second habeas petitions.5
In the words of President Clinton, the law sought to ensure that "[flrom
now on criminals sentenced to death for their vicious crimes will no
longer be able to use endless appeals to delay their sentences."6 In 1996,
the hated criminals Whose rights the politicians refuse to countenance are
the violent murderers, terrorists, and drug dealers who inspire fear and
hatred in suburban voters whose status as "swing voters" in the modern
electoral calculus 7 invites tough-on-crime posturing from both political
See, e.g., ALLAN NEVINS ET AL., A POCKET HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 246-55
(9th ed. 1992). Nevins notes that "after the secession of the southern states there was no
longer any effective opposition in the halls of Congress" to the Republican party, id. at
246, which had among its goals "rewarding those who had been loyal and punishing those
who had been disloyal," id. at 252.
2 The Court discussed, interpreted, and ruled on the constitutionality of these congres-
sional actions in a series of cases during the late Reconstruction period. See Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869) (upholding repeal of Court's authority to review circuit
court habeas denials); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868) (holding that Congress
could not eliminate Court authority to entertain original habeas petitions). See generally
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872) (addressing appellate jurisdiction in
a presidential pardon case).
3 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
and 21 U.S.C.) (1996).4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(b) (1996).
5 See id. § 2244(b)(3).6 Remarks by the President at Signing of Antiterrorism Bill; M2 Presswire, Apr. 29,
1996, available in 1996 WL 7897846 [hereinafter Remarks].
7 See, e.g., Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
527, 537 (1996) (noting that campaign attacks against heinous crimes, such as the Bush
campaign's infamous 1988 Willie Horton advertisement, "relayed powerfully the suburban
swing-voter's worst nightmare").
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parties. 8 As one House of Representatives aide explained, "The Democrats
in the center are trying to prove they're as tough on crime as the Repub-
licans. People think that we need to start frying people" '9
Between 1867 and 1996, legal scholars built a small cottage industry
studying the interesting constitutional quirk that the Reconstruction-era
jurisdiction-stripping cases illuminated: one critical function of the fed-
eral judiciary is to protect individual rights against legislative infringe-
ment; but the Constitution's Exceptions Clause grants a congressional
majority the power to deny the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear a
case.10 How can the Court protect the minority's voice against the same
government whose legislature, by majority vote, can silence it? The key
8 For Democratic posturing, see, for example, Remarks, supra note 6. For Republican
posturing, see, for example, Orrin G. Hatch, Rule of Law: Is Clinton Tough on Crime?
Just Look at His Judges, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1996, at A15, arguing that Clinton-appointed
judges "have sympathized with criminal defendants ... [while] the Republicans ... have
worked hard literally for decades to end the abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by death
row murderers."
9 Jane Hunter, United States: Legislation Targets Death Row, Mideast Groups, INT'L
PRESS SERV., Apr. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9810224 (quoting an anonymous House
aide).
For criticism of this bipartisan hostility toward convicts' appeals, see, for example,
Jeffrey Rosen, Shell Game, NEw REPUBLIC, May 13, 1996, at 6, claiming that the
Clinton-Hatch Bill can be seen as "radically restricting federal courts' ability to review
violations of federal constitutional law"; Charles Levendosky, Reforming Away a Funda-
mental Right, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 24, 1996, at B7, asserting that "[tihe Great
Writ has been a weapon against unfair trials [and that] Congress ignores that in its panic
to appear tough on crime"; So Long, Civil Liberties, PROGRESSIVE, May 1, 1996, at 8,
stating that "President Clinton is trying to fuel his reelection campaign by setting fire to
the Bill of Rights.'
101n addition to its.original jurisdiction, "the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as
the Congress shall make." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). For arguments
that Congress's Exceptions Clause power is plenary, see, for example, Gerald Gunther,
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power
to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An
Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REv. 900 (1982).
For a variety of arguments that Congress's Exceptions Clause power is limited in some
way, see, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article 111. Separating
the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Evan H. Caminker,
Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994);
William S. Dodge, Note, Congressional Control of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction:
Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an "Essential Role", 100 YALE L.J. 1013
(1991); Gunther, supra; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard
G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); Redish, supra; Lawrence Gene Sager, Supreme Court,
1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdic-
tional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981).
For an elaboration of the various proposed limits on Congress's Exceptions Clause
power, see, infra Parts IV.B. and V.
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question the theorists addressed was the extent of Congress's Exceptions
Clause power to circumscribe the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Is that
power plenary or limited? If it is limited, what is it that Congress cannot
do?
Politically motivated jurisdiction-stripping proposals "have surfaced
in virtually every period of controversial federal court decisions?' 11 "It is
an old story: the courts get in the way and make the politicians angry."
12
Since the Civil War, though, the only two such proposals that have be-
come law were the 1867 and 1996 repeals of Supreme Court jurisdiction
over appeals from lower court denials of habeas petitions. The fact that
these two proposals became law may, in part, be due to the fact that they
did not concern "areas where a lot of powerful people were arrayed on
both sides," but instead "target[ed] immigrants, prisoners, and the poor-
people who don't vote or can't vote?"
13
Because the vast majority of jurisdiction-stripping efforts has failed,
the case law on the subject, while containing intriguing dicta, is sparse.
14
In many fields of law, the theorists have not had to struggle to generate
new ideas to reflect the latest case law. But in jurisdiction-stripping, the
small band of theorists, like the mysterious family in the Luigi Pirandello
I Gunther, supra note 10, at 896. Over the past two decades, Congress has most
frequently seen jurisdiction-stripping proposals after the failure of proposed constitutional
amendments to repeal the substance of Supreme Court decisions. From 1981 to 1982 alone,
thirty jurisdiction-stripping bills were introduced in Congress, most issuing due to dissat-
isfaction with Court decisions on the controversial "social issues" of school prayer,
abortion, and busing. Id. at 895-96.
In 1984, Senator Jesse Helms responded to the failure of a school prayer amendment
by suggesting a repeal of federal court jurisdiction over prayer cases as a "way for
Congress to provide a check on arrogant Supreme Court Justices who routinely distort the
Constitution to suit their own notions of public policy." Id. at 922 n.l (quoting 130 CONG.
REc. S.2901 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1984)) (statement of Senator Helms).
In the 1990s, Patrick Buchanan has consistently called for jurisdiction repeals based
on the Congress's Exceptions Clause power as "an easier method of redress than amending
the Constitution" when the "renegade third branch" makes a decision as bad as Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), which recognized flag burning as protected expressive
speech. Patrick J. Buchanan, Flag Amendment is Our Rebellion, HOUSTON CHRON., June
16, 1990, available in 1996 WL 28224823. Buchanan, especially in his 1996 presidential
campaign, has since advocated a variety of other curbs on Court power through aggressive
use of Congress's Exceptions Clause power. "In their eternal wisdom, the founding fathers
left us a large club with which to smack down an arrogant Supreme Court." Patrick J.
Buchanan, Smack Down the Court .... SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 24, 1989, at B10.
12Linda Greenhouse, How Congress Curtailed the Courts' Jurisdiction, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1996, at A5.
13Id.
14Bits of dicta in several cases hint that, if directly pressed with the question, the
Court would find limits on Congress's Exceptions Clause power. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988) ("We emphasized ...that where Congress intends to preclude
judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.") (citation
omitted) (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974)); Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 606 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There is a serious question
whether the McCardle case could command a majority view today.").
1997]
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play Six Characters in Search of an Author,'5 had a long and frustrating
wait for a stage to give their ideas life.
Felker v. Turpin,16 the challenge to the 1996 Act's habeas restrictions,
provided just such a high-drama stage. The Court, after its spring term
had ended, stayed the execution of a violent repeat criminal to hold a
special June hearing on the constitutional challenges to the two-month-old
Act that had led to a denial of review of Felker's second federal habeas
petition, which had been filed from death row and had been denied by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 17 Scholars were intrigued because
Felker promised the first major Exceptions Clause ruling since Recon-
struction.
The Felker opinion found the Act and its jurisdiction-stripping con-
stitutional. This decision seems to strike a blow against the notion of an
independent federal judiciary that preserves individual rights from in-
fringement by the criminal justice system or the whims of temporary
legislative majorities.18 Yet the Court gave the jurisdiction repeal a narrow
construction, preserving the Court's power to review, by different proce-
dures, any habeas claims the circuit courts deny.19 This jurisdictional
"loophole" falls squarely in line not only with the Reconstruction-era
Court's resolution of similar issues 20 but also with the arguments of those
theorists who argue that Congress's Exceptions Clause power is limited
in that Congress cannot strip so much of the Court's jurisdiction as to
impair its essential role of using appellate review to ensure the uniformity
and supremacy of federal law.21
Thus, contrary to first appearances, the Felker opinion signaled that
the Supreme Court will not easily acquiesce in congressional attempts to
slash the Court's jurisdiction for political ends, even when the Court
agrees with the end in question. If Felker's narrow interpretation of the
Act seems anticlimactic 2 2 it remains noteworthy precisely because it de-
clined to reach the climax some anticipated: a finding of unrestricted
plenary congressional power to circumscribe Supreme Court jurisdiction.23
15 Luigi Pirandello, Six Characters in Search of an Author, in EIGHT MODERN PLAYS
210 (Anthony Caputi ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1991).
16 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
17 See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 1588 (1996) (mem.).
18 See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
19See id.
20See cases cited supra note 2.
21 See Ratner, supra note 10, at 158.
2 2 See, e.g., Robert Marquand, Court Tackles New U.S. Law Curbing Death-Row
Appeals; Case May Redefine Balance of Poivers Between Congress and Courts, CHRISTIAN
ScI. MONITOR, June 3, 1996, at 3, (asserting, before the Felker decision, that "[i]f the
Court does not touch any part of Congress's death-penalty act, the Felker case could well
be a landmark, ceding to Congress federal powers the Court has held since habeas corpus
was enshrined in law in 1867").23Id.
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This Recent Development begins by sketching the Felker case's his-
tory and outcome, and then delineates the major theoretical schools on
jurisdiction-stripping. The piece ultimately concludes that Felker's out-
come comports closely with the leading essential role theory-that Con-
gress cannot restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction so much as to
impair its ability to use its powers of review to ensure the uniformity and
supremacy of federal law. The Court's adherence to this theory maintains
the uniformity of federal rights and protects the institution of judicial
review against politicians constant attempts to circumvent the Court for
temporary political gains.
II. Facts and Procedural History
On April 24, 1996, Congress passed, and the President signed, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Section 106 of
the Act restricts second or successive habeas petitions both substantively
and procedurally. Substantively, subsections 106(b)(1) and 106(b)(2) man-
date dismissal of claims already made in the first petition and only permit
new claims when:
106(b)(2)(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or
106(b)(2)(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not
have been discovered previously through the exercise of due
diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.
24
Procedurally, subsection 106(b)(3) creates an unappealable gatekeeper
for second or successive habeas petitions.25 Any such petition filed with
a district court is immediately transferred to a three-judge panel of the
relevant court of appeals. 26 The appellate panel serves the gatekeeping
function of deciding whether, under the new Section 106(b) criteria, the
petition makes a sufficient preliminary showing to warrant return to the
24 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,
1220-21 § 106 (b)(2) (1996).25 1d. § 106(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 1221.
26 See id. § 106(b)(3)(B), 110 Stat. at 1221.
1997]
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district court for full consideration. 27 If the appellate panel decides that
the petition fails the 106(b) criteria, its decision to deny the petition
outright is final. Under subsection 106(b)(3)(E), the appellate panel's
decision to deny the petition "shall not be appealable and shall not be the
subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari. '28 It did not
take long for a test case challenging the constitutionality of these subsec-
tions to percolate up from the state of Georgia.
Shortly after finishing four years in prison on a rape conviction, Ellis
Wayne Felker was charged with aggravated sodomy and murder. A jury
convicted Felker of murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprison-
ment, sentencing him to death for the murder.29 The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed Felker's conviction and death sentence. 30 A state trial court
denied his petition for collateral relief.31 Felker's first federal petition for
a writ of habeas corpus fared no better, with the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia denying the petition, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirming, 32 and the Supreme Court
denying certiorari.
33
On May 2, 1996, the beginning of the week during which Felker was
to be executed, the Georgia Supreme Court denied his second state peti-
tion for collateral relief. That same day, Felker filed his second federal
habeas petition with the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to the new gatekeeper
procedure 34 in a pleading that also challenged the constitutionality of the
Act. 35 Handing down its opinion later that day, the Eleventh Circuit denied
Felker's habeas petition, finding that his two new claims did not satisfy
the 106(b) standards, 36 as they neither relied on a "new rule of constitu-
tional law,"37 nor had a basis in facts that would disprove Felker's guilt
and "could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of
due diligence."38 The Eleventh Circuit declined to rule on the constitu-
tionality of the Act, finding that Felker "would not be entitled to any relief
27See id. § 106(b)(3)(C), 110 Stat. at 1221.
211d. § 106(b)(3)(E), 110 Stat. at 1221.
29Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2336.
30Felker v. State, 314 S.E.2d 621 (Ga. 1984).
31Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2336.32Felker v. Turpin, 52 F.3d 907, extended on denial of petition for reh'g, 62 F.3d 342
(11th Cir. 1995).33Felker, 116 S. Ct. 956 (1996).34 Felker v. Turpin, 83 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 24-27 and
accompanying text.
351d. at 1307.
36 d. at 1306-08 (stating that Felker challenged the reasonable doubt jury instruction
at his trial and offered new evidence that called the testimony of a state expert witness
into question).
37 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.




even under pre-Act law,"39 so "the Act's restrictions can have no uncon-
stitutional effect on him:'40 Felker appealed to the Supreme Court in a
pleading that again challenged the constitutionality of the Act's habeas
restrictions and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.
III. The Supreme Court Decisions
A. The Grant of Certiorari
On May 3, 1996, the Court granted Felker's petition for a writ of
certiorari to address the Act's interpretation and constitutionality. It also
granted Felker a stay of execution pending the resolution of those issues
and consideration of his habeas petition. The Court scheduled oral argu-
ment for exactly one month later, June 3, on three questions: (1) whether
the Act, "in particular Section 106(b)(3)(E) . ... is an unconstitutional
restriction of the jurisdiction of this Court;" (2) whether the new provi-
sions "apply to petitions for habeas corpus filed as original matters with
this Court;" and (3) whether "application of the Act in this case is a
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of Art. I, § 9, clause
2 of the Constitution' 41 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, dissented from the "expedited briefing of the important ques-
tions raised by the petition of certiorari and application for a writ of
habeas corpus," arguing that "cbnsideration of them should be undertaken
with the utmost deliberation, rather than unseemly haste'
42
B. The Unanimous. Rehnquist Opinion
Handing down its final opinion on June 28, 1996, a unanimous Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Act while declining to apply its new
restrictions to habeas petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court
rather than with a district court.43 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist recognized the jurisdiction limitation as a legitimate exercise
391d. at 1313; see also infra note 51 and accompanying text.
40 d. at 1307.
41Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 1588 (1996) (mem.).
4 2 Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 1588 (1996) (mem.) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
43The Court's appellate jurisdiction encompasses two ways to review habeas petitions.
First, the Court can hear appeals from circuit court denials of habeas petitions. Second, it
can issue its own writs of habeas corpus based on petitions filed originally with the Court.
"Such a petition is commonly understood to be 'original' in the sense of being filed in the
first instance in this Court, but nonetheless for constitutional purposes an exercise of this
Court's appellate (rather than original) jurisdiction" because any habeas petition is, at root,
an appeal of a conviction. Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 (1996) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (citing Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original." Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme
Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 153).
19971
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of Congress's Exceptions Clause power. Yet, he construed the jurisdiction-
stripping measure narrowly, thereby mitigating its impact.
The Court held that "the Act has not repealed our authority to enter-
tain original habeas petitions" because it did not do so explicitly.44 It cited
Exparte Yerger,45 addressing a similar 1868 statutory restriction of habeas
rights, to support its narrow construction of this congressional effort to
repeal Supreme Court habeas jurisdiction. According to Yerger, a repeal
of Court authority to review circuit court habeas denials does not imply
a repeal of Court authority to grant its own writs of habeas corpus, even
in cases where a circuit court has denied an identical habeas petition filed
earlier with the district court. "Repeals by implication are not favored...
and the continued exercise of original habeas jurisdiction [is] not 'repug-
nant' to a prohibition on review by appeal of circuit court habeas judg-
ments.
46
The Court proceeded to apply the Yerger Court logic to the case at
hand, upholding the new restrictions on habeas petitions filed with district
courts while refusing to extend these limits to habeas petitions filed
originally with the Supreme Court. On the procedural level, the Court
reasoned that because the statute's gatekeeper provisions refer only to
applications filed in the district courts, the Supreme Court could still
consider original habeas petitions without first forwarding them to an
appellate three-judge panel.47 The Court paralleled this procedural maneu-
ver on the substantive level by sidestepping the question of whether its
consideration of original habeas petitions must adhere to the Act's rules
for denying second habeas petitions. The Court simply stated, "Whether
or not we are bound by these restrictions, they certainly inform our
consideration of original habeas petitions" 48
By limiting the scope of the Act's jurisdiction scale-back, this Yer-
ger-based interpretation staves off the claim that the repeal exceeded
Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause. The Court's retention of
the power to issue its own habeas writs enabled it to declare that "there
can be no plausible argument that the Act has deprived this Court of
appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2:149 The Exceptions
Clause clearly grants Congress at least some power to limit and regulate
the Court's appellate jurisdiction, 50 the retention of alternate appellate
44Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2338.
4575 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).




50See id. (citing Durousseau v. United States, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810),
United States v. More, 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) 159, 172-73 (1805)).
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avenues seems to ensure that Congress has not exceeded the scope of that
power.
The Court also held that the restrictions on second or successive
habeas petitions did not constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. Rather, in light of similar preexisting habeas limi-
tations,51 the new measures are mere "added restrictions" to a "modified
res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice
'abuse of the writ."' 52 Habeas rights have evolved over time, both broad-
ening in scope (covering state prisoners, for example) and narrowing in
depth (denying most second petitions). According to the Court, the new
restrictions are "well within the compass of this evolutionary process.
53
Finally, having reserved its power to do so, the Court considered
Felker's direct application for a writ of habeas corpus. It denied the
application without discussing its merits, noting that it failed to satisfy
the high hurdle that the Court sets for such applications: "To justify the
granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must show exceptional
circumstances warranting the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers
and must show that adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form
or from any other court. These writs are rarely granted.
54
C. The Stevens and Souter Concurrences
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, while joining the unanimous
Rehnquist opinion, also joined the two concurrences penned by Justices
Stevens and Souter. Both concurrences stressed that while the Court could
not review the gatekeeping decisions, through a variety of alternative
appellate paths, it could still review the same cases and even the standards
the circuit courts used in their gatekeeping decisions. Indeed, the two
concurrences differed only in emphasis, with Justice Souter more strongly
suggesting that closure of those alternative paths might exceed Congress's
Exceptions Clause power.
55
Justice Stevens noted that "[t]he Act does not purport to limit our
jurisdiction'" under other statutes, to review interlocutory orders and to
take certified questions from circuit court gatekeeping decisions.5 6 Nor
does it purport to "limit our jurisdiction under the All Writs Act,"57 which,
51 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (holding that a second or
successive habeas petition, barring a rare showing of "fundamental miscarriage of justice
... from a failure to entertain the claim," must include a new claim and prove both cause
for not raising the claim earlier and actual prejudice from a denial of the present petition).52Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2340.
53 
Id.
54 Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (citing Sup. CT. REv. 20.4(a)).
55 Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2342 (Souter, J., concurring).
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as Justice Souter similarly explained, grants the Court "authority to issue
appropriate writs in aid of another exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 58
Justice Stevens observed that in spite of the 1996 Act's explicit elimina-
tion of certiorari review of gatekeeping decisions, the retained All Writs
authority ensures that those decisions actually "are not immune from
direct review " 59 Moreover, given the Court's retention of authority over
original habeas petitions, Stevens noted that "in the exercise of our habeas
corpus jurisdiction, we may consider earlier gatekeeping orders entered
by the court of appeals to inform our judgments and provide the parties
with the functional equivalent of direct review."60
Justice Souter went a bit further in stressing the importance of alter-
nate avenues, musing that any congressional action to block them could
exceed its Exceptions Clause power:
I write only to add that if it should later turn out that statutory
avenues other than certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping deter-
mination were closed, the question whether the statute exceeded
Congress's Exceptions Clause power would be open. The ques-
tion could arise if the Courts of Appeals adopted divergent
interpretations of the gatekeeper standard.61
IV. Legal Setting: Views on the Scope of Congressional Power over
Court Jurisdiction
A. Case Law
While the Court decided Felker against an unusually small body of
precedent, the holding was fully consistent with the Reconstruction-era
cases that were strongly on point. In 1867, Congress had granted the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over circuit court decisions denying
habeas corpus. Congress retracted this grant the very next year, however,
as it "fear[ed] the Court was about to invalidate the Reconstruction Acts"
through this new power.62 Upholding Congress's repeal of jurisdiction, the
McCardle Court, like the Felker Court, "carefully pointed out that the
repeal did not affect its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus" filed
originally with the Court.63 The Court's decision to uphold was predicated
on the preservation of original jurisdiction, an issue decided the year
before in Ex parte Yerger.64 The Felker Court stood firmly on Yerger,
581d. at 2341 (Souter, J., concurring).591d. at 2341 (Stevens, J., concurring).
6 01d.
61Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2342 (Souter, J., concurring).
62 Ratner, supra note 10, at 178-79.63 Id. at 179.
6475 U.S. (8 WaIl.) 85 (1869).
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declaring "we declined to find a repeal... by implication then, [and] we
decline to find a similar repeal ... by implication now.'
65
B. Theories
In contrast to the clear but dated case law, the theoretical debate on
jurisdiction-stripping displays great divergence on the question of whether
Congress possesses plenary or limited power to circumscribe the Court's
appellate jurisdiction. As the most important Exceptions Clause power
case since Reconstruction, Felker offers important insight into the Court's
views on this question.
Prior to Felker, there were three major schools of thought regarding
the Exceptions Clause. The first camp views Congress's authority as
plenary, with no inherent limits on the constitutional grant of congres-
sional power to determine appellate jurisdiction.66 Because "there is sim-
ply no . . . limit on the face of the Exceptions Clause," plenary power
theorists argue, any claim that jurisdiction-stripping destroys the tradi-
tional constitutional structure "confuses the familiar with the necessary,
the desirable with the constitutionally mandated?'
67
The second school of thought also views the Exceptions Clause as a
categorical grant of plenary power, but only over Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction. In certain circumstances, these scholars conclude, some fed-
eral court must retain appellate jurisdiction. Congress, therefore, can strip
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction as long as it leaves some inferior
federal court with jurisdiction to hear appeals that the Supreme Court
cannot.6
The third school of thought, maintaining that the Exceptions Clause
cannot authorize exceptions that engulf the rule of judicial review, would
impose a threshold limit on Congress's power. According to these essen-
tial role scholars, "the exceptions must not be such as will destroy the
essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan*'69 Yet the
scope of this essential role, and by extension the limits of congressional
jurisdiction authority, is not self-evident.
70
65Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2339.
66 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 10, at 902-03.67Gunther, supra note 10, at 903.
68 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 10, at 255; Sager, supra note 10, at 61-68.
69 Hart, supra note 10, at 1364-65; see also Ratner, supra note 10, at 160-61 (stating
that the Court must retain sufficient appellate jurisdiction to fulfill its essential role of
ensuring the uniformity and supremacy of federal law); Dodge, supra note 10, at 1074
(arguing that the Court must retain sufficient jurisdiction to preserve its essential role "as
the most important court in the nation,' which other constitutional language, such as the
grant of the Court's original jurisdiction, implies).70See Hart, supra note 10, at 1365 (advocating for the first time that the "essential
role" limit on Congress's Exceptions Clause power could be "indeterminate").
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While it would be difficult, and not particularly meaningful, to assess
the exact level of support each theory has garnered, it is important to note
that most of the recent debate has been between two particular camps.
The first is the plenary power position that constitutes one extreme pole
in the debate on the extent of Congress's Exceptions Clause power.71 The
second appears to be Professor Leonard Ratner's specification of the
essential role theory, as recognized by Ratner's critics and supporters
alike.7
2
V. Analysis: Felker and the Essential Role of Ensuring Federal Law
Uniformity
The analysis of the Felker Court comports precisely with Ratner's
version of essential role theory, which argues that the Court must retain
sufficient jurisdiction to protect the uniformity and supremacy of federal
law. The concurrences supported this notion even more explicitly, stress-
ing that the Act is saved precisely via the Court's retained jurisdiction.
Through these alternate avenues, the Court can protect the supremacy and
uniformity of federal law.
According to Ratner, the main threat of congressional jurisdiction-
stripping is that by eliminating decisive review of federal and constitu-
tional law, "[it can reduce the supreme law of the land ... to a hodge-
podge of inconsistent decisions by making fifty state courts and eleven
federal courts of appeals the final judges of the meaning and application
of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. '73 Because of
the lack of consistency across state and lower federal courts in decision
making, the Supreme Court's essential appellate functions are the assur-
ance of uniformity and the maintenance of supremacy of federal law. The
court must be able to retain jurisdiction in order to secure uniformity
through its resolution of inconsistent interpretations of federal law as well
as to ensure supremacy by upholding the application of federal law when
state laws or actions conflict with it.74 Therefore, Ratner argues that "legis-
lation denying the Court jurisdiction to review any case involving [that]
subject would effectively obstruct those functions in th[e] proscribed
area" and thereby exceed Congress's Exceptions Clause power.75 He con-
71 See Gunther, supra note 10; Redish, supra note 10.
72See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 10, at 835 (discussing Ratner's thesis with approval);
Gunther, supra note 10, at 901-02 ("Far and away the most widely voiced modern
argument for internal limitations is that the 'exceptions' power of Congress cannot be
exercised in a way that would interfere with the 'essential' or 'core' functions of the
Supreme Court .... The most insistent modern advocate of this type of limit is Leonard
Ratner."); Tribe, supra note 10, at 135 (citing Ratner's definition of the essential role with




tinues by asserting, "some avenue must remain open to permit ultimate
resolution by the Supreme Court of persistent conflicts" among courts
interpreting federal law.76 Evan Caminker expresses similar justifications
of Supreme Court jurisdiction based on uniformity concerns. In Caminker's
view, the Court must "have subject matter jurisdiction sufficiently broad to
provide general leadership in defining federal law.
77
The construction Yerger, McCardle, and Felker limited congressional
attempts to repeal Supreme Court habeas jurisdiction and fits well with
the essential role notion that some avenue must remain open for the Court
to ensure federal law supremacy and uniformity. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
unanimous opinion stressed that the jurisdiction repeal did not exceed any
possible limit on Congress's Exceptions Clause power because the Court
retained authority to review original habeas petitions in the same cases
where the Act had eliminated its capacity to review appellate court habeas
denials.78 Justice Stevens's concurrence noted still other appellate avenues
that "provide the parties with the functional equivalent of direct review."
79
Justice Souter opined that the Court should employ these alternate ave-
nues "if the Courts of Appeals adopted divergent interpretations of the
gatekeeper standard." 80
In fact, the Felker concurrences may imply an even narrower inter-
pretation of Congress's Exceptions Clause and regulations power and a
broader sphere of essential Supreme Court jurisdiction than even the
recent essential role advocates had envisioned. According to Ratner and
Caminker, for example, the need for uniformity still permits Congress to
exclude a class of cases from Court jurisdiction because the Court "need
not rule in every case"81 so long as it retains "some avenue" to address
"persistent conflicts?' 82 In contrast, Justice Souter's Felker concurrence
saw a need to maintain "avenues ... for reviewing a gatekeeping deter-
mination" in each particular case,83 not just in a sufficient portion of cases
to allow the Court the occasional chance to expound general principles.
In essence, under Justice Souter's view, Congress can pass regula-
tions that restrict the "how" (through original habeas petitions, not review
of circuit court habeas denials), but not exceptions that restrict the "whether"
(no consideration at all of petitions the gatekeepers reject), of Supreme
Court jurisdiction. By apparently interpreting exceptions to extend no
further than regulations, all that the Felker and McCardle Courts permit-
76 See id.
77 Caminker, supra note 10, at 837.
7 8Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2339.
79d. at 2341 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80 d. at 2342 (Souter, J., concurring).
s Caminker, supra note 10, at 835 n.73; see also Ratner, supra note 10, at 171
(regulations may "sometimes forbid a particular act").
82 Ratner, supra note 10, at 161.83 Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2342 (Souter, J., concurring).
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ted, in fact, were regulations, repeals that do not entirely remove any
cases from Supreme Court jurisdiction. Justice Souter suggested that he
would prohibit Congress from sealing off particular cases from all ave-
nues of review. Chief Justice Rehnquist's implied possible agreement in
explaining that the Act did not exceed the Exceptions Clause power
because it left the Court jurisdiction to hear original habeas petitions. To
the extent that the Court might have struck down a true habeas "excep-
tion," the Exceptions Clause power may be limited to neutral restrictions
of jurisdiction that do not disfavor any particular right.
VI. Implications of Felker
In reserving its authority to hear habeas petitions as original matters,
then, the Court was making more than a token defense against congres-
sional encroachment on its turf. Indeed, the Respondent's Brief argues
that such a narrow construction of the jurisdictional repeal as the one the
Court in fact chose would actually "circumvent the new statutory scheme
so as to nullify its provisions .. . by allowing petitioners to file original
applications in this Court without first going through the authorization to
file procedure.
'84
Of course, while the Court found it important to preserve alternate
avenues of review, those avenues have been traditionally employed only
in exceptional circumstances. It is unclear whether the Court will use
them more now that they are the sole means of review in certain cases.
Justice Souter's allusion to divergent appellate standards hints that the
Court might be most inclined to utilize an alternate avenue of habeas
review where the uniformity of federal law, whether constitutional or
statutory, is threatened. Yet the Supreme Court's reservation of these
alternate avenues means that, regardless of how often it chooses to do so,
it can review at will the same habeas petitions the Act purported to take
out of its jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, even if it hears the occasional habeas appeal, the Court
will not be circumventing the Act's entire habeas-restricting scheme. Both
the new substantive limits on district court petitions and the mandatory
gatekeeping panels serve Congress's intent to curb the number of succes-
sive writs of habeas corpus filed and help relieve overcrowded district
court dockets. Indeed, the Court that has expressed outright hostility to
repeat habeas petitions,85 and arguably even general skepticism about all
habeas petitions, 86 may be unlikely to use what had been exceptional
84 Respondent's Brief at *20, Felker (No. 95-8836), available in 1996 WL 272387.85 See, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (noting explicitly that the Court
generally disfavors "endless repetitive petitions!').86See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 439 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
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procedural devices to ensure habeas review whenever merited by an indi-
vidual case. When Court reviews any successive habeas petitions, it has
indicated in recent years that its motivations are likely to be systemic
concerns such as federal law uniformity rather than concerns for individ-
ual justice.
8 7
VII. Conclusion: Felker as Futile Lesson in the Folly and Danger of
Jurisdiction Tinkering
One clear legacy of Felker may be its illustration of the almost comic
incoherence that results from jurisdiction-stripping efforts. Congress seized
upon a constitutional loophole that apparently allowed a legislative ma-
jority to chisel away at judicial review. In response, the Court seized upon
loopholes in Congress's repeal in order to prevent the erosion of judicial
review. Congress reaps what it sows; loopholes beget loopholes.
While this gamesmanship among branches of the government does
not inherently threaten the American legal regime, repeated and well-
crafted attacks on judicial review potentially do. If Congress exercises its
Exceptions Clause power to silence the Court by simple legislative ma-
jority, the Constitution ceases to restrain the political branches; its prin-
ciples are then reduced from mandates to mere suggestions that politicians
may ignore when a majority of them so desire. Of course, while legal
scholars concerned with the constitutional implications of circumscribed
judicial review will find this danger greatly disturbing, those individuals
responsible for the mess will surely lose no sleep over the matter. Among
the slumbering Will be those politicians who are completely unconcerned
with appellate jurisdiction except as a means to the end of striking a blow
against the rights of those unpopular in the latest polls.
-Scott Moss*
("The only principle that would appear to reconcile [the majority's inconsistent positions]
is the principle that habeas relief should be denied whenever possible:').
87 See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 at 477 (recognizing the need for the Court to
use its appellate jurisdiction to clarify the "confusion ... on the standard for determining
when a petitioner abuses the writ" with successive petitions).
* For this Recent Development's existence, I owe thanks to George Moss, Roy Swan,
and Kurt Vonnegut, without whom I probably would not have decided to become a lawyer,
enter legal writing, and adopt laughable opinions, respectively.
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